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Abstract 
The present work is a comment of a recent paper by Fortin and coauthors (Fortin 2017) in which the 
authors propose the introduction of Bohmian mechanics (BM) in the philosophy of chemistry and 
the use of standard quantum mechanics (SQM) as a mere instrument of prediction. This way would 
allow overcoming the obstacles found in linking molecular chemistry and quantum mechanics.  
Starting from some remarks on the orbital concept, we highlight and discuss some general issues 
that need to be taken into account when two scientific theories coexist within the same investigation 
field, i.e. SQM and BM. 
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Commentary 
The work by Fortin, Lombardi and Martinez Gonzales is extremely relevant and raises some 
general issues that deserve to be underlined. The authors propose that the introduction of Bohmian 
Mechanics (BM) in the philosophy of chemistry might overcome, or at least decrease, the obstacles 
found in linking molecular chemistry and quantum mechanics: “At this point, it is worth clearly 
stressing that the arguments presented above belong to the field of the foundations and the 
philosophy of chemistry […] the conceptual difficulties derived from the link between molecular 
chemistry and quantum mechanics would be tackled from a Bohmian perspective” (Fortin 2017). 
Nevertheless, the authors neither think nor propose to replace standard quantum mechanics (SQM) 
with BM in scientific practice: “By no means is it suggested that SQM should be replaced with BM 
in the actual practice of molecular chemistry or of quantum chemistry. In fact, the use of BM not 
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only is unnecessary in a field whose practitioners are taught and trained with the formal resources of 
SQM, but also is not convenient to the extent that the mathematical calculations of BM rapidly 
become highly intractable with the increase of the system’s complexity”. They suggest using SQM 
as “a mere instrumental tool for prediction” (Fortin 2017). 
This would be possible as BM and SQM are distinct theoretical tools, sharing a same empirical 
content: “Bohmian mechanics (BM) is not an interpretation of the standard formalism, but a 
different theory with the same predictive power as SQM. Both theories are empirically equivalent 
(Goldstein 2016)”. This leads to underdetermination: “The possibility of empirical equivalence 
between scientific theories leads to the thesis of the underdetermination of scientific theory by 
evidence (or by data), which is based on the simple idea that the evidence available to us may be 
insufficient to determine what beliefs we should hold in response to it”. 
This Comment is structured as follows: in the first part, we will highlight and discuss some general 
issues that need to be taken into account when two scientific theories coexist within a same 
investigation field, i.e. SQM and BM. We will then analyze the examples that Fortin and coauthors 
have chosen for showing that the description provided by SQM is totally different from that 
provided by molecular chemistry. Fortin and coauthors discuss three cases: (a) the notion of orbital, 
(b) the components of the atom and (3) the concept of molecular structure. We will limit our 
discussion to the first one. A discussion of the concept of orbital cannot neglect the essential aspect 
of modelling. Hence, the notion of scientific model will be briefly discussed and related with the 
concept of orbital. A short conclusion will be finally provided. 
Two scientific theories for the same empirical field 
The paper by Fortin and coauthors draws attention to the epistemic relationship between theories. 
This relationship is discussed for two distinct cases: theories belonging to different disciplines 
(chemistry vs. physics) and rival theories within a same discipline (SQM vs. BM). These are totally 
different cases that Fortin and coauthors tackle differently, as they actually deserve. Nonetheless, 
their discussion should be preceded by a general evaluation of the epistemic nature of theories. In 
fact, such an evaluation provides a general philosophic frame for the more specific issue of the 
relationship between distinct theories. In addition, it helps to highlight aspects of both theories 
which are relevant to an epistemic analysis of their connection. The viewpoint from which theories 
are considered is important because the “choice of a view of theories is a form of philosophical 
modeling of science” (Griesemer 2013). Historically, three standpoints on scientific theories have 
been established. The syntactic view may be related to the 'logical positivists' of the Vienna Circle 
and the subsequent elaboration by Carl Hempel in the 1960s. It considers a scientific theory as a set 
of sentences that may be expressed in the appropriate logical language and derived from a meta-
mathematical axiomatization of the theory. In a sense, the very same title of the foundational work 
by Rudolf Carnap (Der logische Aufbau der Welt, 1928) expresses very clearly the cognitive 
purposes of the proponents of this viewpoint. The semantic view shifts the philosopher’s attention 
from the logical analysis of theories towards an investigation based on mathematical models. A 
relevant supporter of this standpoint is the Dutch philosopher Bas van Fraassen (mentioned by 
Fortin and coauthors). In his 1980 essential work, van Fraassen clearly speaks of "failure of the 
syntactic approach" and strongly claims that: "the notions of truth and model belong to semantics" 
(van Fraassen 1980, pp. 53 and 43). According to the Dutch philosopher "Any structure which 
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satisfies the axioms of a theory [...] is called a model of that theory", and "The models occupy 
centre stage". Van Fraassen’s models are to be intended in the strictly mathematical sense of the 
theory of models. For example, talking about the Bohr’s atomic model, he distances himself from 
this use of the term: "in the scientists' use, ‘model’ denotes what I would call a model-type" (van 
Fraassen 1980, p. 44). In synthesis: "For the Syntactic View, what is not (or cannot be) 
reconstructed axiomatically is not theoretical, while for the Semantic View, what is not (or cannot 
be) modeled mathematically is not theoretical". Based on this sharp contrast, it is not surprising that 
the supporters of the syntactic vs. semantic views have often chosen a "strategy of combat" within 
the philosophical debate (Winther 2015).  
A more ecumenical strategy characterizes the supporters of a pragmatic view of scientific theories. 
The pragmatic view does not deny the effectiveness of logic-linguistic analysis and mathematical 
models; yet, it considers that the scientific enterprise relies on a wide spectrum of cognitive tools 
that includes non formal tools such as analogies, natural kinds, exemplars (in Kuhn’s acceptation).  
As regards models used by (real) science, the pragmatic view observes that there is "a variety of 
modeling syntaxes – mathematics, diagrams, narratives, simulations, and programs" (Winther 
2012), that need to be discerned and made coherent, "theoretical models (possible realizations of 
theories) [and] empirical models of phenomena (representations of possible realizations of 
phenomena)" (Griesemer 2013). 
Clearly, the choice of a specific philosophical position on the structure of theories is not neutral 
with respect to the focus of the epistemic investigation. Let’s tackle the parallel between chemistry 
and physics proposed by Fortin and coauthors. In the discussion of the concept of orbital that will 
be presented in the next section, we will see that the pragmatic view draws the attention to the 
orbital models, with their inherent (formal and non formal) assumptions. In our view, this is a more 
effective analysis as compared to the analysis fostered by a syntactic view, which would rather 
investigate a possible axiomatic deduction of orbitals from the foundational principles of SQM 
and/or BM. Seemingly, the pragmatic view is more convincing than the semantic view, which 
describes orbitals as mere mathematical structures. 
As regards the comparison between SQM and BM, Fortin and coauthors raise two problems that 
should be kept apart: the underdetermination and the empirical equivalence of theories. Concerning 
underdetermination, Fortin’s approach does not consider that there are at least two kinds of 
underdetermination: holistic and contrastive. According to the former, any theory is a web of belief 
(Quine 1970); hence it is underdetermined with respect to the experimental basis. Conversely, the 
latter takes into account a given experimental basis and maintains that several theories may be 
equally supported by that very same basis (Stanford 2016). The comparison between SQM and BM, 
proposed by Fortin and coworkers, comes under the contrastive underdetermination. The hesitation 
on the foundational proposal by Fortin is reinforced by the fact that even the empirical equivalence 
between SQM and BM is called into question. It is "controversial because it is not clear that we 
understand Quantum Mechanics well enough to say convincingly what formulations of it count as 
genuinely different theories" (Stanford 2001). In addition, even amongst theoretical physicists who 
admit the empirical equivalence of theories, the landscape of quantic theories is more varied than 
the simple comparison between SQM and BM. James Hartle assumes as testbed for valid quantum-
mechanical formulations "a formulation that [...] reproduces the standard textbook answers for the 
probabilities of measurements". Hartle counts 13 distinct formulations as valid, although he finally 
compares only three of them: SQM, BM and his own formulation that “is logically consistent, 
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consistent with experiment as far as is known, consistent with textbook predictions for 
measurements, and applicable to the most general physical systems". Just like Fortin and 
coworkers, Hartle also admits that – due to the empirical equivalence – the lab cannot be the 
discriminant for establishing which theory is to be preferred. He reports: "We may be able to 
distinguish interpretations by their utility and/or their promise as starting points for generalizations 
or alternatives to quantum theory" (Hartle 2005). It is worth recalling that, the experimental basis 
being open, there isn’t any guarantee that the experimental equivalence between SQM and BM is 
permanent (Stanford 2016). On the other hand, Hartle’s use of an extra-theoretical and pragmatic 
word such as ‘utility’ seems an explicit reminder of the opportunity of a pragmatic view of theories. 
 
The examples proposed by Fortin and coauthors 
Fortin and coworkers propose three examples aimed at discussing the differences between SQM 
and molecular chemistry. The three of them share a common issue: SQM does not allow identifying 
nor fixing the position of a particle (whatever the particle is, a generic atomic component, an 
electron, the atomic nucleus). Conversely, this is systematically done in quantum chemistry. We 
will comment only one example out of three, i.e. the orbital. In fact, all of them deserve comments; 
particularly the concept of molecular structure, which is probably the most relevant as it deals with 
the chemical approach to living systems (a topic that has been tackled by one of us, Villani 2017). 
Unfortunately, this is a much too wide topic to be treated in a short comment like this; a more 
detailed analysis will be proposed in the future.  
The problem of clarifying the concept of orbital has been widely treated in the literature, as 
witnessed by the essential bibliography provided by Fortin and coworkers. They claim that, in 
molecular chemistry, orbitals are conceived as space regions whereas in quantum mechanics they 
are mathematical functions. According to Fortin and coworkers, this is a main difference between 
the two scientific areas. The concept of orbital cannot be exhaustively tackled nor discussed in a 
commentary. Nevertheless, we would like to underline some aspects of the problem, in line with 
Fortin’s viewpoint that BM and SQM should coexhist and be linked to each other.  
The authors write: “‘Orbital’ is a term that is used both in chemistry and in physics, but refer to 
different items in the two disciplines (Scerri 2000; Labarca and Lombardi 2010; Mulder 2011). 
According to the Oxford Dictionary of Chemistry, both the wave function and its corresponding 
spatial region of high electron density can be called ‘orbital’ (Daintith 2004)”. Fortin and coauthors 
claim that the right definition of orbital is a mathematical function, although this concept is 
substantialized by chemists: “Nevertheless, from referring a mathematical entity, the concept of 
orbital is rapidly substantialized, and the talk of ‘the shape of an orbital’ enters the scene” (Fortin 
2017). Strangely, they mention Mulder (2011) without apparently realizing that he says: “Orbitals 
are states, not entities”, although a few lines later Mulder points out: “So far I have taken orbitals to 
be one-electron wave functions”. Anyway, later in the paper, Fortin and coworkers report: “Let us 
consider the example of the hydrogen atom. According to SQM, when the atom is in the ground 
state, the electron is in the state 1s”.  
These very same quotes suggest that there is a third possibility for the concept of orbital, distinct 
from both the mathematical function and the space region: an orbital is a scientific concept that, 
within SQM and a specific model identifies the electron state. Whenever we say that – in an 
electronic spectroscopy experiment - a beam of a given wavelength allows the electron within the 
hydrogen atom to switch from the 1s ground state to the 2s excited state, we do not mean to say that 
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the electron switches from a mathematical function to another, nor we mean to say that it moves 
from one space region to another. We mean to say that that the electron switches from one state to 
another.  
Two clarifications are needed. First of all, the state of the electron we are dealing with is a dynamic 
state. Nevertheless, both the mathematical function () associated with the electron state (that 
allows calculating specific electronic properties such as the probability of localization within a 
space region) and the space region some time associated to it are essentially static. As a matter of 
fact, the definition of quantum electron state includes dynamical features (such as angular 
momenta), but these are identified by numbers and not by a time-dependent function, just like its 
static features. This occurs because – although quantum mechanics starts with the time-dependent 
Schrödinger equation – it is quickly replaced by the time-independent equation, which leads to the 
determination of stationary states whose time dependence is solely associated with phase Exp[-iEt]. 
Whenever a state perturbation occurs, these states are no longer stationary and their dynamic 
aspects come out. For example, in the presence of an electric field, a molecule is polarized, hence it 
modifies its electron density distribution (from the classical viewpoint, an electronic charge flow 
occurs inside the molecule).  
In the second place, the electron state is fully expressed by the spin-orbital, where the spin 
component is defined as well; hence the expression that ‘an orbital can be occupied by two 
electrons’. This expression deserves caution. If the electron is a mathematical function, how can this 
expression be possibly interpreted? Can a mathematical function ‘be occupied’ by something?  And, 
in general, what do we mean whenever we say that an electron ‘is’ in the 1s or 2p orbital? Actually, 
we mean that both the static and dynamic electron features show specific symmetry properties: e.g., 
the probability distribution of finding an electron at a distance r from the nucleus is spherical 
whenever the electron is in a s-state. This is equally true for actual electron states and virtual states, 
that exist only as a possibility. The latter represent the possibilities that the electron properties 
change in a specific way when the electron is excited and shifts from one state to the other. 
Moreover, it has to be stressed that, from a didactic viewpoint, the representation of orbitals as 
either empty (virtual) or full (real) boxes generates misconceptions and are misleading. 
Clearly, this is well known to Fortin and coworkers as well as to any chemist, although discussions 
on the possibility of ‘seeing’ orbitals leave us doubtful to some extent. Therefore, what is the point 
of persisting in identifying a scientific concept with a mathematical function or a space region?  In 
addition, this is very confusing for students that need to learn the correct concept, thus avoiding to 
materialize the orbital or to take it as a purely formal and somehow arbitrary concept. 
Getting back to the paper by Fortin and coworkers, it seems to us that the orbital - taken as a 
scientific concept that identifies the electron state and allows determining its properties – is 
essential in both SQM and BM. In fact, mechanical theories need to be compared in the wider 
perspective of the discussion of the electron state. In classical mechanics, the dynamic state of a 
particle is represented by a point in the phase space and it is identified by a generalized coordinate 
and by its conjugate momentum. With Bohr, the electron already lost its punctual feature and 
became an orbit. Subsequently, SQM ‘spread out’ the electron state over the whole space, albeit in a 
non uniform way. It is precisely this lack of homogeneity that allows visualizing the space regions 
associated with a specific electron state (through an act that is a mere representation and not a 
materialization of the orbital). In BM, each particle is classical and is associated with a wave that 
drives its movement (pilot-wave) and generates a quantum potential over the particle. It seems to us 
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that there has been a lack of reflection as regards how to define the particle state in the presence of 
such a non-local, holistic potential.  
As the last point of this analysis, we would like to discuss another crucial aspect that - in our view - 
is insufficiently highlighted in the orbital description of multi-electronic atomic and molecular 
states. In general, orbitals are said to represent the state of the electron in a hydrogen atom (hence 
the term hydrogenoid). This is not fully correct. Strictly speaking, orbitals represent electron states 
within a system made of one electron and an atomic nucleus, both of which are considered as 
material points, the only relevant force is the Coulombian one (the others are taken as negligible) 
and there are no relativistic effects. Since this system is similar to the hydrogen atom, the model 
system is almost always confused with the physical system. As a result, orbitals are considered as 
states of a physical system instead of being part of a model. Whenever the modellistic aspect of the 
orbital description is wiped out - both in the hydrogen atom and in multi-electron atoms and 
molecules – the rationale behind such a description becomes unclear. In fact, one can no longer 
understand why the electron states in a hydrogen atom can be useful to describe the states of 
completely distinct systems, such as multi-electron atoms; as a consequence, disputes about the 
degree of ‘reality’ of an orbital come out. According to Mulder, quoted by Fortin and coauthors: 
“The case of electrons in many-electron atoms and molecules is merely quantitatively, not 
qualitatively, different. Therefore, talking about orbitals in terms of either existing or not is not just, 
as Ostrovsky sees it, less appropriate than in terms of being a better or worse approximation; it is 
mistaken. The upshot of this is that I substantially agree with Ostrovsky and Schwarz, although I 
believe their reflections on existence lead astray. Wave functions that are products of orbitals can be 
better or worse approximations to the exact wave function of an atom or molecule; and that is all 
there is to be said concerning the ontological status of orbitals in many-electron systems” (Mulder 
2011). Apart from the identification of the orbital with the wave function, we substantially agree 
with Mulder (and Ostrovsky and Schwarz). Nevertheless, we believe that this quote lacks a term - 
model - that would have made the argument much clearer: a model is always a representation of the 
physical realm, an abstraction that takes into account a selection of features of that realm. Such 
representation can be more or less effective; anyway, this has nothing to do with the actual 
existence of orbitals within the atomic systems. It is just pertinent to the applicability of the model 
in a new context. 
 
Models in science 
The problem of the materialization of abstract entities, conceived within a well defined theoretical 
frame, is related with the lack of a clear-cut distinction between the phenomena that need to be 
interpreted and the interpretative models that may serve this scope.  
According to Jean Perrin, modeling means: “Remplacer du visible compliqué par de l’invisible 
simple” (Jean Perrin cit. in Walliser 1977). Perrin underlines that a model must never be taken as a 
reproduction of a portion of the physical realm. According to Walliser: “in its wider acceptance, the 
notion of models refers to any representation of a real system, either abstract or concrete, expressed 
in a verbal, graphical or mathematical form” (Walliser 1977). Hence, a scientific model is a 
heuristic tool, a logical construct that may serve to justify a given fact and make prediction on the 
behavior of a real system. A model being a tool, is never an end in itself; it always supplies answers 
to problematic questions. As a consequence, a model should never be said to be right or wrong; it 
should rather be found appropriate/inappropriate for the description of a system or a phenomenon. 
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The abstract and interpretive character is particularly evident in the case of orbitals: this concept 
arises within a theory (SQM) and is a conceptual tool fit for the interpretation of the behavior of a 
material system. In chemistry, the concept of orbital - intended as a scientific concept that provides 
information on the electron state within the SQM - allows providing a systematic interpretation for 
atomic and molecular properties. In addition, it allows calculating the static and dynamic properties 
of electrons in these systems and the interpretation of spectroscopic data.  
The concept of orbital is nothing but a conceptual tool, a model whose justification and field of 
existence lies within a theory. To materialize and/or mathematize the orbital is an incorrect 
conceptual operation with several negative outcomes, as it implies mixing up the level of reality 
with the level of models. This general problem has been successfully tackled by Robert Rosen 
(Rosen 1985), who developed a meta-epistemological model known as ‘modelling relation’. 
According to Rosen, the process of building up of scientific knowledge implies the definition of the 
relationship between a natural system (NS), i.e. a portion of the physical realm represented by “a set 
of qualities, to which definite relations can be imputed” (Rosen 1985) and a formal system (FS) that 
models it. The FS results from a codification of the NS, based on rules defined by the modeller, 
consistent with the constraints imposed by empirical/experimental settings and findings. The 
relationship between FS and NS has also a predictive role towards the latter: “We seek to encode 
natural systems into formal ones [such that] the inferences or theorems we can elicit within such 
formal systems become predictions about the natural systems we have encoded into them” (Rosen 
1985, p. 74). Whenever the predictions made through the FS find a correspondence in the NS, we 
say that the FS is a good model of the NS. Observables “are the fundamental units of natural 
systems, just as percepts are the fundamental units of experience” (Rosen 1991, p. 60). Orbitals are 
not observables; hence, according to Rosen, they are undoubtedly part of the FS.  
It seems relevant to underline that “the act of modeling is really the act of relating two systems in a 
subjective way” (Schierwagen 2009). Thanks to that, it is possible to model a same NS through 
distinct FSs. The comparison between the system description provided by SQM and BM falls 
within this case. The relationship between the two theories can be established by their common 
reference to a same NS as well as by their reference to common concept, such as the electron state 
(orbital). 
Rosen stresses that “the difficulty and challenge in establishing such relations [between FS and NS] 
arises from the fact that the entities to be related are fundamentally different in kind. A NS is 
essentially a bundle of linked qualities, or observables, coded or named by the specific percepts 
which they generate and by the relations which the mind creates to organise them. As such, a NS is 
always incompletely known.[…] A FS, on the other hand, is entirely a creation of the mind, 
possessing no properties beyond which enter into its definitions and their implications” (Rosen 
1985).  Nevertheless, a FS is not arbitrary: in fact, the NS and FS are connected by a circular 
relationship, defined by the modelling procedures and the empirical verifications of the 
effectiveness of the model in the interpretation of specific phenomena.  
 
Conclusions 
In conclusion, we would like to underline that the concept of orbital as an expression of the electron 
state is crucial and allows comparing distinct theories. We have stressed that orbitals belongs to a 
modellistic description of the physical realm. Such a conception helps to overcome two conceptual 
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attitudes (the materialization and the mathematization of the concept of orbital) that may lead to 
logical contradictions and generate misconceptions in teaching practice.  
The work by Fortin and coauthors provides a relevant contribution to the discussion concerning the 
relationship between disciplines and theories. Namely, it highlights that the same concept - the 
orbital - is employed very differently in molecular chemistry and quantum mechanics:  for example, 
the two domains make a very different use of the spatial visualisation of some properties of atomic 
and molecular systems. This is an important aspect that should not be neglected whenever 
chemistry and physics are confronted.  
Nevertheless, such a confrontation needs to be set in the wider perspective of the investigations on 
the nature of each discipline. Each of the three above-mentioned views of theories allows us to 
construct a different model of traditional disciplines (chemistry, physics, biology, etc.). In our 
opinion, the foundational problems can be tackled in very different ways depending on the object of 
the epistemological analysis. This object may be a theoretical corpus understood as the result of an 
axiomatic derivation, a structure of connected mathematical models, or a set of modelling syntaxes. 
The last case corresponds to the pragmatic view of theories: from this vantage point, no 'external' 
foundation is seen as necessary for a discipline. 
From a pragmatic viewpoint, distinct syntactic models may be included in the theoretical corpus of 
a discipline; so, the possibility of using both SQM and BM within the theoretical structure of 
chemistry is plausible. Conversely, the proposal of making a clear-cut distinct use of two theories (a 
mere instrumental use for SQM and a foundational use for BM) does not seem necessary. 
Clearly, the relevance of deepening the discussion of the relationship between different disciplines 
and theories is undoubted. Had we analysed the example concerning molecular structure, the 
discussion would have been extended to a third discipline - biology - besides physics and chemistry. 
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